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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE dba
B&B PLAZA INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

Civil No. 86-0402

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE
VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN PRESIDING

STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
Contrary to Rules 9 and 24, Rules of the Supreme Court,
appellants have failed to state the proper jurisdictional basis
for this appeal either in their docketing statement or in their
brief.

Dismissal of the appeal is warranted for this reason

based on Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments Ltd., 735 P.2d 33
(Utah 1987) .
Further, respondent contends that this appeal should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because appellants did not

timely file notice of appeal.

The grounds for this contention

are stated in Point I of the Argument.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
The following issues are presented by this appeal:
1.

Whether the jurisdiction of this Court has been

properly established.
2.

Whether the District Court properly rules that

appellants' claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725, the
statute of repose for actions arising from the sale of goods.
DETERMINATIVE STATUES
The interplay of two statutes of repose and one statute of
limitation are determinative of this appeal on the merits.
Respondent contends that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2--725 bars this
action:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for
sale must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action has accrued. By original agreement
the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not
less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of
the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered.
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Respondent further contends that appellants' claim is barred by
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 which requires the following actions
to be brought within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;
also upon an open account for goods, wares and
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store
account; also on an open account for work, labor or
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided,
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after the last
charge is made or the last payment is received.
(2) An action for relief no; otherwise provided
for by law.
Appellants assert that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 allows
their claim to proceed despite the two foregoing statutes:
No action to recover damages for any injury to
property, real or personal, or for any injury to the
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of
an improvement to real property, nor any action for
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing
the design, planning, supervision of construction or
construction of such improvement to real property more
than seven years after the completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, or any other legal
entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purpose of this act shall mean the date of issuance
of a certificate of substantial completion by the
owner, architect, engineer, or other agents, or
the date of the owner's use or possession of the
improvement on real property.
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This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by
the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Cottles brought suit against LeGrand Johnson for
damages allegedly arising out of defective cement sold to the
Cottles by LeGrand Johnson.
in 1978.
split.

The cement was sold to the Cottles

In the Spring of 1979 the cement began to crack and

The Cottles filed their Complaint in November, 1985.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On May 1, 1986, LeGrand Johnson moved to dismiss the
Complaint based on Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 because the
action was not taken within four years from the date of sale of
the cement.

The motion was fully briefed and submitted without

oral argument.

On June 2, 1986, District Judge Christoffersen

issued a memorandum decision granting LeGrand Johnson's Motion
to Dismiss.

Decision attached as Addendum A.

On June 16, 1986, a Judgment and Dismissal with Prejudice
was signed and filed with the clerk.

On June 18, 1986, LeGrand

Johnson filed Notice of Entry of Judgment notifying the
Cottles' counsel that judgment had been entered on June 16,
1986.
On July 21, 1986, the Cottles filed notice of appeal.

On

July 31, 1986, LeGrand Johnson moved this court to dismiss the
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appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

On August 18, 1986, the

Cottles obtained an ex parte extension of time to file notice
of appeal from District Judge Christoffersen.

On September 29,

1986, this Court granted the Motion to Dismiss because the
notice of appeal was not timely filed and the ex parte
extension of time was ineffective.
On October 13, 1986, the Cottles moved for reconsideration
of the dismissal of appeal and this Court then remanded the case
for a hearing on whether an extension of the time should be
allowed.

District Judge Christoffersen held such a hearing on

December 8, 1986 and issued a memorandum decision on January 12,
1987 finding that the extension of time was appropriate.
Statement of Facts
Jurisdiction.

The dates which are pertinent to whether the

Cottles have timely perfected their appeal are set forth in the
Course of Proceedings.

There is no dispute that the notice of

appeal was not filed within 30 days after the date of entry of
judgment.

There is also no dispute that Notice of Entry of

Judgment was mailed to the office of appellants' counsel on
June 18, 1986. Notice attached as Addendum B.
The basis for the District Court's finding of excusable
neglect is the Affidavit of John T. Caine, attached as Addendum
C.

In that affidavit Mr. Caine denies receiving the Notice of

Entry of Judgment.

He admits, however, that he contacted the

district court clerk's office in late June, 1986 to determine
when the judgment had been entered.

He was advised by the

clerk that "the Notice of Entry of Judgment was dated June 19,
1986."

Without learning when the judgment rather than the

notice of judgment had been filed, Mr. Caine assumed that he
had 30 days from June 19, 1986 in which to file notice of
appeal.
Merits.

The Cottles' Complaint alleged that they

"contracted with the defendant for the purchase of concrete
which was to be poured at plaintiffs' business establishment
. ..."

Complaint, 1f 2.

The Complaint alleged that an

employee of defendant "promised that a guaranty or warranty
concerning the cement would be provided."

Complaint, 1f 3.

The

Cottles claimed that: "The cement utilized for the construction
was substandard and was not strong enough for the purpose
required, that is, for storage sheds that would house both
vehicles and other heavy equipment."

Complaint, 1f 4.

The

Cottles further claimed that: "Beginning in the Spring of 1979,
the cement began to crack and split and subsequent to that
time, the plaintiffs' use of the property had been limited and,
in some cases, impossible because of the defective cement.1'
Complaint, 1f 5.

Finally, the Cottles allege that: "The cement

was defective in its design."

Complaint, 1f 6.
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In support of its motion to dismiss, LeGrand Johnson
submitted the Affidavit of Larry Jardine which established that
the Cottles had submitted an order for concrete, that LeGrand
Johnson had prepared the concrete and delivered it to the
Cottles1 construction site and poured it into forms which had
already been constructed at the site. Affidavit of Larry
Jardine, 1f1f 3, 4.

Mr. Jardine further testified that LeGrand

Johnson did not design the concrete.

Affidavit of Larry

Jardine, 1f 6.
In response to LeGrand Johnson's motion, the Cottles
submitted the Affidavit of Billie J. Cottle which established
that the order for concrete was actually placed by the Cottles'
general contractor.

Affidavit of Billie J. Cottle, 1f 1A. Mr.

Cottle further alleged that "all decisions concerning the mix
of the concrete and how it was poured were made exclusively by
the defendant . . . ." Affidavit of Billie J. Cottle, 1f 1C.
The sale of concrete took place some time in 1978. The
Cottles first became aware of deficiencies in the Spring of
1979.

Complaint, 1f 5.

Despite appellants' inference, there is no evidence that
LeGrand Johnson designed the concrete or in any sense
constructed the structures into which it was poured.

The

Cottles allege in their brief that: "The defendant poured the
concrete, it provided the forms, it formed the floor and walls
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of the storage units and in fact, handled all the construction."

Brief of Appellants, p. 5.

With the exception of

pouring the concrete, this statement is completely unsupported
by the record and in fact directly contradicts the Affidavit by
Billie J. Cottle which indicates that a third party, Skip
Duffin, was used to set the forms. Affidavit of Billie J.
Cottle, 1[ IB.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT.
Appellants should not have been granted an extension of
time in which to file notice of the appeal.

Rule 4(e), Rules

of the Supreme Court of Utah, only allows such an extension
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.

The failure

of plaintiffs' counsel to properly determine the date of entry
of judgment should not be considered as excusable neglect.
The advisory committee notes to Rule 4(e) explain the
exceptional circumstances which must be shown before an
extension should be permitted:
Excusable neglect for good cause under this paragraph
refers generally to an extraordinary circumstance that
prevented the movant from filing a timely notice of
appeal and not to inadvertence or oversight on the
part of counsel or the failure of the client to
authorize an appeal.
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Advisory Committee Notes p. 179, Utah Code Annotated, attached
as Addendum D.

Here, counsel's misunderstanding with the clerk

about when the judgment was filed is no more than simple
inadvertence.
it.

There is nothing unusual or extraordinary about

In Galanis v. Moyes, 16 Utah 2d 181, 397 P.2d 988 (1965),

this Court ruled that counsel's neglect in failing to check the
docket was not excusable neglect sufficient to justify a late
notice of appeal.

Similarly here, counsel for appellants

simply did not check for the correct document in the clerk's
file.

Under these circumstances, respondent submits that

District Judge Christoffersen erred in granting an extension of
time in which to file the notice of appeal.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 70A-2-725 BARS THIS ACTION.
Despite the Cottles' efforts to make this case something
different, it is no more than a claim that the concrete sold by
defendant was inadequate.

Utah's version of the Uniform

Commercial Code requires that such an action be commenced
within four years after the delivery of the goods.
Ann. § 70A-2-725 (1965).

Utah Code

The statute is plainly applicable to

any warranty of fitness for a particular purpose as well.
Here, the Cottles did not file their action until seven years
after the sale of the cement.

The action is untimely and was

correctly dismissed.
-9-

This Court elaborated on the proper scope of § 70A-2-725 in
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Company, 681 P.2d 214 (Utah
1984).

There, the plaintiff was a subcontractor who had

purchased doors from the defendant wholesaler.

The wholesaler

shipped the doors to the job site where they were installed by
the subcontractor.

The trial court dismissed the wholesaler as

a matter of law based on § 70A-2-725.
On appeal, the subcontractor contended that the six year
period for actions upon a written contract should have been
applied instead.

This contention was rejected with the

following language:
[T]he trial court was correct in rejecting the
application of this general statute of limitations.
When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the
more specific provision will govern over the more
general provision. Thus, where the Uniform Commercial
Code sets forth a limitation period for a specific
type of action, this limitation controls over an
older, more general statute of limitation. That rule
establishes § 70A-2-725 as the applicable statute of
limitations for the cause of action alleged in this
case.
Id. at 216 (citations omitted).

Perry confirms that the UCC

statute was correctly applied here.

As here, the plaintiff in

Perry attempted to avoid the statute by suggesting that its
action was a claim for indemnity rather than a claim for a
breach of warranty.

This Court rejected that attempt and

applied the UCC statute because the claim concerned the sale of
goods.

This Court stated:
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The absolute language of § 70A-2-725, including the
provision that an action accrues at the time of tender
delivery regardless of whether an aggrieved party
knows of the breach, indicates a legislative intent
that all actions based on breach of contract for the
sale of goods be brought, if at all, within four years
of the tender of delivery. This interpretation is
further supported by the statutory provision
prohibiting the parties from extending the limitation
period by agreement. The statute was apparently
intended to afford ultimate repose in transactions for
the sale of goods.
Id. at 219.
The fact that LeGrand Johnson sold the cement for use at a
construction site does not change the nature of this claim or
the length of time in which to bring suit.

In W.R.H., Inc. v.

Economy Builders' Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981), the
purchaser of plywood siding brought an action against the
seller of the siding for damages which resulted when the siding
delaminated.

A representative of the seller had told the buyer

that it was "lifetime siding."

_Id. at 43.

The trial court

granted summary judgment for the seller based on § 70A-2-725.
This Court reversed because it found genuine issues of fact
concerning whether the seller was liable in negligence.

Unlike

the present case, that action had been filed within four years
from when the product began to deteriorate.

To the extent the

present action sounds in negligence, it is barred by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25 (1953) .
However, this Court went on to indicate that dismissal of
plaintiff's contract claim was appropriate under § 70A-2-725.
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Id, at 46. Unless warranties of future performance had been
given this Court stated that "the limitation period has clearly
run."

Ld. at 46.

The supplier of cement here should be

treated no differently than the supplier of plywood siding in
W.R.H. Inc.
Other jurisdictions have also applied the UCC statute of
repose in construction cases.

In R,W. Murray Company v.

Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983), the UCC
statute was applied to a claim against the supplier of aluminum
framing for a large office building, even though the supplier
had provided technical advice and drawings relating to the
design of aluminum framing.

In Sawyer v. Camp Dudley, 38 UCCRS

1287 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1984), the UCC statute was applied to a
claim against a supplier of sand and gravel who was to screen
and deliver a certain amount of sand and gravel of specified
sizes.
The District Court properly refused to apply Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25.5.

It concerns actions "arising out of the defec-

tive and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property or
actions against persons performing or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision of construction, or construction of such
improvement to real property."

Such actions cannot be taken

more than seven years after the completion of construction.
Yet, the statute does not allow the Cottles more than four
years after discovery of a defect in the cement; to take action.
-12-

Section 78-12-25.5 is a statute of repose, not a statute of
limitation.

It cuts off all actions against those involved in

construction seven years after the date of substantial completion.

It is not exclusive of other statutes which are

applicable and run from the sale of goods or the date of discovery of the injury.

Indeed, Section 78-12-25.5 specifically

states in its last paragraph that: "This provision shall not be
construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise
prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action."

Here, the laws of Utah prescribe that an action based

on the sale of goods shall be taken within four years of
delivery.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725.

An action based on

negligence shall be taken within four years within the date of
injury.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.

Those periods of lim-

itation bar this action in its entirety notwithstanding the
statute of repose for actions against those involved in
construction.
In sum, the District Court correctly characterized the
Cottles' claim as an action arising out of the sale of goods
and properly applied the UCC statute of repose to bar the
action.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, respondent submits that this Court
should decline to assert jurisdiction over this matter.
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If the

Court finds that it has jurisdiction, then District Judge
Christoffersen's dismissal of appellants' Complaint based on
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 should be affirmed.
DATED this ^

day of October, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

HEta^ffiondkjr. Berry
John^f Lund
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four
true and correct copies of Brief of Respondent to counsel for
appellants, John T. Caine, Richards, Caine & Allen, 2568
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, 84401 on this j _
October, 1987.

~Johp^K. Lund
SCMJRL121
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day of
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE,
dba B & B PLAZE, INC.,
Plaitniffs
LE GRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No.

24518

Defendant
Plaintiffs have sued the defendants in their complaint alleging
their general contractor contracted with the defendant for the
purchase of cement to be used in the construction by the general
contractor of their place of business.
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds the
action is barred by the statute of limitations relating to goods
sold.

The allegations of the plaintiffs is that the goods sold

were substandard and not strong enough for the purpose supplied.
The defendants allege this is barred by Sec. 78-2-725 U.C.A. a
four year statute on warranty in a contract for sale of goods. The
plaintiffs alleging in their complaint, an agent of defendant
promised a guarantee and warranty concerning the cement to be
provided.
The plaintiffs contention is ±hat -the complaint is governed
by a different statute, Sec. 78-12-25.5 U.C.A. concerning action
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement

ADDENDUM A

to real property or actions against persons performing or
furnishing the design, supervision of construction, or construction
of such imporveraent to real property, which is a seven year statute.
Plaintiffs didn't file their action until seven years after
the sale of the cement.
they sold and

It wasn't really cement but concrete

delivered to the site.

But, the Court holds this still is goods furnished under the
four year statute of limitations.

Defendant simply provided the

goods ordered by the general contractor.
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
for defendant to prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this

J <N &

day of June/ 19 86.

Counsel

TabB

RAYMOND M. BERRY
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE,
dba B & B PLAZA, INC.,
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 24,518
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEY, JOHN T. CAINE:
Please take notice that Judgment was made and entered in
favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs on June 16,
1986.
DATED this /»

day of June, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ADDENDUM B

MAILING CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

DIANE PERRY, being duly sworn, states that she is employed
in the office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
Defendant
a n d t h a t s h e s e r v e a a copy of
Notice of Entry of Judgment
upon the following parties:
Mr. John T. Caine
Attorney for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

.by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope and mailing the
same postage prepaid on,the 1 8 t h day of J u n e ^
, 1986.

SECRETARY
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this »*thday of
1986.
f
./-»
My Commission Expires:

June

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
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John T. Caine of
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 399-4191

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE,
dba B & B PLAZA, INC.,
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN T. CAINE
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS

Plaint Iffs/Appellants,
vs.
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
O0MPANY, INC.,

Case No. 860402-

Defendant/Respondent.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

ss.

Comes now, JOHN T. CAINE, and after being duly sworn upon
his oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am the attorney for the above named Plaintiffs.

2.

That your Affiant represented the Plaintiffs in the

matters before tlie First Judicial District Court, concerning
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment.
3.

That on June 5, 1986, your Affiant received from the

Court, a copy of Judge, Chr i stof f ersonf s Memorandum Decision
granting Defendant's Motibn and directing Defendant's counsel to
prepare the Order.
4.

On or about June 12, 1986, your Affiant received an
1
ADDENDUM C

unsigned proposed

Judgment, with a letter indicating that the

same had been sent to Judge Chrlstofferson.
5.

That your Affiant has received no further correspondence

from Defendant's attorney,

Including

the purported Notice of

Entry of Judgment, which was allegedly sent on June 18, 1986.

No

such document was received by your Affiant, nor his office.
6.

That

the first

time your Affiant

saw such Notice of

Entry of Judgment was attached to Defendant's Motion.
7.

That

your Affiant contacted

the Clerk of the District

Court in Cache County in late June to determine when the Judgment
had been

signed and was

advised

that "the Notice of Entry of

Judgment was dated June 19, 1986".

Your Affiant therefore, used

this date for the f1 ling of Appeal.

The 19th day of July, 1986,

failing on a Saturday, the appeal was filed on Monday the 21st
day of July, 1986 according to the Rules.
8.
not

At the time of the filing of the Appeal, the Clerk did

advised your Affiant

Judgment was different

that

the date of the actual Entry of

and your Affiant

had no idea that

the

Judgment had actually been entered on the 16th day of June, until
receiving Defendant's Motion.
9.

That

upon

receiving Defendant's Motion, your Affiant

reviewed the record from Cache County and discovered the mistake.
Apparently, the Clerk of the Court had advised your Affiant that
Defendant's Notice of Judgment was there (which was in fact filed
on June 19, 1986), instead of giving your Affiant the actual date
of the docketing of the Judgment, on the 16th day of June, 1986.
2

10.

Your Affiant believes that he acted In good faith and

upon the information given him and In this particular incident,
the Court, in its discretion should allow the filing of the
Appeal.
11.

Further youry^ffiant sayeth not.

DATED this

f W jijy of August, lj

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/V2£day of August,

1986.

.^TARY PUBLfc yf\
Residing at: LydUc
ttf
t
Commission Expires: ////<?£
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MASTER ANNOTATION VOLUME
RAP-4<b)

RAP-4

within the prescribed time after the entry of the
« & « \*9 V&* dtemcv. QQN3\ &Vspo&Y&% ^ \te. ?cv&\toct.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no
counterpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in
substantial part, an adoption of Rule 4(aX2)
FRAP.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals (see
prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires that a
notice of the cross-appeal be filed within 14 days
after the date of the first notice of appeal. The
paragraph adopts substantially the time period and
concept of cross-appeal in Rule 4(aX3) FRAP.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph retains the prior
practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that the time for
filing a notice of appeal may be extended by the
district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect
or good cause, if a motion for extension is filed not
later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed in paragraphs (a) or (b). The application
shall be on motion and may be ex parte (although
ex parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior to
the expiration of the time for appeal. The district
court may not grant an extension exceeding 30 days
past the original time for appeal or 10 days from
the date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later. Excusable neglect or good
cause under this paragraph refers generally to aa
extraordinary circumstance that prevented the
movant from filing a timely notice of appeal and
not to inadvertence or oversight on the part of
counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize
an appeal.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE,

RAP-4(a)
Unless RP-2.9(b) has been complied with, the
judgment in question is not deemed "filed" within
the meaning of RCP-58A(c) and the time for
taking an appeal from that judgment under old
RCP-73(a) or new RAP-4(a) does not begin to run
because the judgment has not been properly
"entered/
CALFO v. D. C. STEWART CO., 717 P.2d 697,
30 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, (03/28/86)

RAP-4(b)
A nouce of appeal filed before the disposition of
a proper post-judgment motion Is ineffective to
confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court.
Finality of a judgment is suspended upon timely
filing of a post-judgment motion under this rule,
and the time for appeal does not commence until
final disposition of that motion.
TRANSAMERICA CASH RESERVE v. HAFEN,
39 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, (08/05/86)
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the
Supreme Court by stipulation. Under old Rule
73(a) a notice of appeal is ineffective if it is filed
prior to a trial court's disposition of a postjudgment motion under Rule 59(a)(6). The
Supreme Court will not consider an appeal until
the trial court has had an opportunity to review the
order in question by ruling on the post-judgment
motions.
A filing of a nouce of appeal does not constitute
an implied abandonment of Rule 59 motions. The
abandonment of a motion for a new trial must be
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intentional. A stipulation of the parties for .a
ce^tau£a& vuBddssL ?M!R. VKJi\ llkfiMosft doe* oat.
imply an abandonment or withdrawl.
BAILEY v. SOUND LAB, INC., 694 P M 1043,
(12/21/84)

RAP-5
Where a decision of a circuit court doe* not.
resolve the case as to all issues and all parties,
review is available only under RCP-54(b). The
discretionary review under RAP-5 is not available
since that rule is specifically limited to application
by tbe Supreme Court.
MABUD v. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL
AIRLINES, 717 ?M 1350, 33 Utah Adv. Rtp, 6,
(04/30/86)
Where complaint alleged four causes of action,
including lien foreclosure, breach of contract,
failure to obtain bond, and quantum meriut, and
where district court granted summary judgment in
favor of certain defendants declaring them to have
priority over the mechanic's lien, an appeal was
premature. Although the summary judgment
established the lenders' priority over the lien
claimants' interests, the trial court had not
determined issues pertaining to such things as the
validity of the liens or the amounts secured by the
liens. The appeal was therefore not from a final
appealable order.
The parties failed to avail themselves of the
procedures of RCP-54(b). Neither was review of
an interlocutory order granted under RCP-72(b)
(now superseded by RAP-5).
ALL WEATHER INSULATION v. AM1RON
DEVELOPMENT CORP., 702 P.2d 1176, 13 Utah
Adv. Rep. 53, (07/03/85)
This Rule retains in Utah appellate practice (see
prior Rule 72(b) URCivP) the authority of the
Supreme Court to review on appeal interlocutory
orders of the district court. Exercise of this power
of review rests entirely within the discretion of the
Court. The provisions of the Rule expand on pnor
Rule 72(b). Because of the statutory certification
procedure for interlocutory appeals in the federal
system, the Rule does not necessarily have any
relationship to Rule 5 FRAP.
Paragraph (a). Under this paragraph, a petition
for permission to appeal from an interlocutory
order must be made within 20 days after the entry
of the order (prior Rule 72(b) gave the petitioner
one month).
Paragraph (c). This paragraph spells out the
CQotenu which a. oetiuoa Cot oexmicuaa to anqeal
shall contain and requires that a copy of the
interlocutory order, findings, conclusions and
opinion of the district court be attached. Any party
in opposition to or in concurrence with the petition
has 10 days'to file an answer whereupon the
petition shall be submitted without oral argument
unless ordered by the Supreme Court.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph sets forth the
general standard for granting a petition for
permission to appeal, viz., that it appears that the
interlocutory order involves substantial rights
materially affecting the final decision or that the
determination of the correctness of the order
before final judgment will better serve the interests
of justice. The appeal may be granted on one or
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intentional. A stipulation of the parties for a
within the prescribed time after the entry of the
certification under Rule 54(b) likewise does not
order by the district court disposing of the motion.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no imply an abandonment or withdraw].
BAILEY v. SOUND LAB, INC., 694 P*2d 1043,
counterpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in
substantial part, an adoption of Rule 4(a)(2) (12/21/84)
FRAP.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the RAP-5
Where a decision of a circuit court does not
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals (see
prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires that a resolve the case as to all issues and all parties,
notice of the cross-appeal be filed within 14 days review is available only under RCP-54(b). The
after the date of the first notice of appeal. The discretionary review under RAP-5 is not available
paragraph adopts substantially the time period and since that rule is specifically limited to application
by the Supreme Court.
concept of cross-appeal in Rule 4(a)(3) FRAP.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph retains the prior MABUD v. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL
practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that the time for AIRLINES, 717 P.2d 1350, 33 Utah Adv. Rtp, $,
filing a notice of appeal may be extended by the (04/30/86)
district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect
Where complaint alleged four causes of action,
or good cause, if a motion for extension is filed not I
later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 1 including lien foreclosure, breach of contract,
failure to obtain bond, and quantum meriut, and
prescribed in paragraphs (a) or (b). The application
shall be on motion and may be ex parte (although where district court granted summary judgment in
favor of certain defendants declaring them to have
ex parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior to
priority over the mechanic's lien, an appeal was
the expiration of the time for appeal. The district
court may not grant an extension exceeding 30 days premature. Although the summary judgment
past the original time for appeal or 10 days from established the lenders' priority over the lien
the date of entry of the order granting the motion, claimants' interests, the trial court had not
determined issues pertaining to such things as the
whichever occurs later. Excusable neglect or good
cause under this paragraph refers generally to an validity of the liens or the amounts secured by the
extraordinary circumstance that prevented the liens. The appeal was therefore not from a final
appealable order.
movant from filing a timely notice of appeal and
The parties failed to avail themselves of the
not to inadvertence or oversight on the part of
counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize procedures of RCP-54(b). Neither was review of
an interlocutory order granted under RCP-72(b)
an appeal.
(now superseded by RAP-5).
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE,
ALL WEATHER INSULATION v. AMIRON
DEVELOPMENT CORP., 702 P.2d 1176, 13 Utah
RAP-4(a)
Unless RP-2.9(b) has been complied with, the Adv. Rep. 53, (07/03/85)
judgment in question is not deemed "filed" within
the meaning of RCP-58A(c) and the time for
taking an appeal from that judgment under old
RCP-73(a) or new RAP-4(a) does not begin to run
because the judgment has not been properly
'entered."
CALFO v. D. C. STEWART CO., 717 P.2d 697,
30 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, (03/28/86)

RAP-4(b)
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
a proper post-judgment motion Is ineffective to
confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court.
Finality of a judgment is suspended upon timely
filing of a post-judgment motion under this rule,
and the time for appeal does not commence until
final disposition of that motion.
TRANSAMERICA CASH RESERVE v. HAFEN,
39 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, (08/05/86)
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the
Supreme Court by stipulation. Under old Rule
73(a) a notice of appeal is ineffective if it is filed
prior to a trial court's disposition of a postjudgment motion under Rule 59(a)(6). The
Supreme Court will not consider an appeal until
the trial court has had an opportunity to review the
order in question by ruling on the post-judgment
motions.
A filing of a notice of appeal does not constitute
an implied abandonment of Rule 59 motions. The
abandonment of a motion for a new trial must be

This Rule retains in Utah appellate practice (see
prior Rule 72(b) URCivP) the authority of the
Supreme Court to review on appeal interlocutory
orders of the district court. Exercise of this power
of review rests entirely within the discretion of the
Court. The provisions of the Rule expand on prior
Rule 72(b). Because of the statutory certification
procedure for interlocutory appeals in the federal
system, the Rule does not necessarily have any
relationship to Rule 5 FRAP.
Paragraph (a). Under this paragraph, a petition
for permission to appeal from an interlocutory
order must be made within 20 days after the entry
of the order (prior Rule 72(b) gave the petitioner
one month).
Paragraph (c). This paragraph spells out the
contents which a petition for permission to appeal
shall contain and requires that a copy of the
interlocutory order, findings, conclusions and
opinion of the district court be attached. Any party
in opposition to or in concurrence with the petition
has 10 days'to file an answer whereupon the
petition shall be submitted without oral argument
unless ordered by the Supreme Court.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph sets forth the
general standard for granting a petition for
permission to appeal, viz., that it appears that the
interlocutory order involves substantial rights
materially affecting the final decision or that the
determination of the correctness of the order
before final judgment will better serve the interests
of justice. The appeal may be granted on one or

For all later ANNOTATIONS, see the most recent issue of the Utah Advance Reports.

